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Abstract The paper explores the significance of Darwinian
evolution for morality and moral theory. After presenting
Darwin’s own views on the evolution of the moral sense
and the Victorian spectrum of opinion on the relevance of
natural selection to morals, I argue that a consideration of
human evolutionary history can be brought to bear
meaningfully on a number of contemporary issues, includ-
ing the nature of work and family relations. There is no
reason, however, to suppose that the fact of human
variation and the heritability of traits forces any substantial
concession to apologists for social inequality.
Keywords Altruism . Ambivalence . Darwin . Darwinism .
Eugenics . Evolutionary ethics . Equality . IQ .Morality
Introduction
According to the terms of Charles Darwin’s theory of
evolution by natural selection, we human beings are the
descendants of ape-like forebears and the remote descend-
ants of one-celled organisms that once floated in a primeval
ocean. All that we can understand, imagine, believe, and do
is dependent on the anatomy and physiology of our brains,
which are products of natural selection as much as our
limbs and our other organs. We try to maintain ourselves in
existence for as long as possible—to achieve a respectable
span of 70 or 80 years—and to produce offspring who will
themselves be capable of producing offspring. It is pointless
to ask what the purpose of our existence is. Our species is
here because a number of singly improbable events
converged to bring our species onto the stage, and there
are only the particular purposes that we establish for
ourselves. The universe is not in the hands of a powerful
and intelligent agent whose benevolence will ensure that
everything will turn out for the best.
Many philosophers find these views inspiring, rather
than bleak, liberating, rather than dispiriting. The appreci-
ation of our kinship with nonhuman animals and the sense
of the unity and coherence of the natural world that
Darwinism implies arouse sentiments as respectful as those
experienced by religious believers while leaving no doubt
that the remediation of social injustice and the restoration
and repair of the environment are up to us. Steven Pinker
has argued recently that attention to the new human
sciences and especially to “evolutionary psychology,” the
study of the evolutionary history of attitudes, emotions, and
mental capabilities, promises “a naturalness in human
relationships, encouraging us to treat people in terms of
how they do feel rather than how some theory says they
ought to feel” (Pinker 2002, xi).
It would be a mistake in any case to think that Darwinism
leads to nihilism—the view that all is permitted but nothing is
actually worth doing—or to suppose that the acceptance of
Darwinian evolution precipitated a sudden crisis in moral
theory. For Darwin’s Origin of Species of 1859 was not the
first book to hint at a natural as opposed to a supernatural
origin for human beings. Throughout the late eighteenth
century, the evident similarity between apes and humans had
attracted attention. German, French, and Scottish philosophy,
medicine, and natural history contained a distinctly materi-
alistic and evolutionary strand, and Darwin’s own grandfa-
ther, Erasmus Darwin, had posited a single common ancestor
for all living creatures. Charles Darwin’s originality lay in
his giving precision to the theory of evolution and extinction
by reference to the principle of miniscule variation from
generation to generation, with variations that gave the
slightest edge in reproduction retained. The quality and
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quantity of evidence and the younger Darwin’s ability to
address objections to the theory of evolution by variation and
selection were staggering. Meanwhile, for millennia, moral
philosophers had offered accounts of virtue and moral
motivation that did not mention a God who lays down
ethical commandments or appeal to divine reward and
punishment as inducements and sanctions.
Nevertheless, the acceptance of Darwinism has narrowed
the options where the foundations of morality are
concerned. If the aim of morality is to reduce human
suffering and to guide people to act and experience in
ways that minimize harms to others, the starting point of
moral theorizing ought to be human beings as they exist in
nature. The secular tradition in ethics derived from the
pagan and atheistical philosophers of the pre-Christian era
does not seem adequate, however, to the problems of the
mass societies of the industrial and post-industrial era. It is
worth asking whether the Darwinian conception of nature
can open up any new ways of thinking about the
foundations of morality or make any contribution to moral
progress in a world that human beings have transformed
so thoroughly.
Some years ago, E.O. Wilson declared that the time had
come “for ethics to be removed temporarily from the hands
of the philosophers and biologicized” (Wilson 1975, 562).
My purpose in this essay is to begin to explore this
recommendation in a hopeful but also critical spirit by
considering three interpretations of the term “Darwinian
morality.” The term can be taken as referring, first, to
Darwin’s own account of selection for moral conscience
and moral behavior in human beings and their precursors in
other animals. Second, it refers to Darwin’s conception of
moral virtue and moral progress, topics about which he, like
many Victorians, thought a good deal. Third, “Darwinian
morality” can be understood as the array of moral and political
implications that have been drawn from his account of
evolution by later theorists. In this third sense, Darwinian
morality includes many implications that would not have
occurred to Darwin himself or that he would have rejected
with indignation as incompatible with his views.
After first presenting some of the most frequently
encountered objections to the proposed marriage of biology
and morality, I will turn to a survey of Darwin’s own
writings on morals, following these sections with a
discussion of the problems and prospects for a biologically
informed ethics. While the first half of this essay is based
on material familiar to Darwin scholars, the second part
reaches into some areas of moral philosophy that remain
ripe for exploration. My central argument is that the
biological sciences can contribute to moral progress—not
just to the explanation of the origins and formation of moral
attitudes and dispositions—but only by working to dispel
the myths and superstitions that sustain oppressive social
relations. The existence of measurable physical and
psychological differences between individuals and between
groups that are the result of random variation on one hand
and the selective pressures operating on early humans and
their ancestors on the other does not defeat arguments for
the moral rightness and practical possibility of greater
social equality.
Warnings of the Wary
To many moral philosophers, claims for the relevance and
helpfulness of the biological sciences are hollow, false, or
dangerous (Farber 1998; Kitcher 1987). There are several
reasons for skepticism and caution. First, there is the
celebrated argument of David Hume that “ought” cannot be
derived from “is,” that no fact about how things are in the
world, however well-established, can logically entail that
something or other ought or ought not to be done. Of
course, to thrive, people need fresh air, clean water, tasty,
nutritious food, and elbow room, and most do not have
enough of these goods. No one disputes that, if such needs
could be met universally without producing some horrific
set of side effects, it would be good to do so. However,
specialized biological knowledge is not required to identify
these basic goods, and to describe them as needed rather
than as merely appreciated is to smuggle normativity into
the description. Truly neutral biological facts—such as the
fact that human men are on average taller and heavier than
women—seem to carry no definite implications with them
concerning what it is morally correct to do. Our evolution-
arily acquired psychological attitudes and dispositions have
an evident bearing on how persons, events, and situations
are judged, but nothing compels us to say that the resulting
judgements are reasonable or correct.
Second, the methodology of much popular evolutionary
ethics depends on what might be called “suggestive
similitude.” The behavior of ducks, peacocks, and bluebirds
is sometimes cited as though it is relevant to human rape,
display, or jealous aggression and the behavior of ants as
though it is relevant to human slavery or division of labor.
But as rape is not the usual mode of animal reproduction
and as most animals do not make slaves, such phenomena
are relevant only to the extent that the constraints and
affordances of human social life can be shown specially to
resemble those of ducks, peacocks, bluebirds, and ants.
Finally, there is near universal acknowledgment that the
practical application of ethical naturalism in the early to
mid-twentieth century was a moral blot on our species. The
casual assumption of innate cognitive, moral, and emotion-
al deficiencies in nonwhite humans goes back to David
Hume and Thomas Carlyle, but, after Darwin, racism
assumed a new, pseudo-scientific form, guided by the
276 Evo Edu Outreach (2010) 3:275–287
assumption that the “races” of human beings instantiated
both earlier, wilder types and later, civilized types, each
with the fixed characteristics of its breed. Researchers
eagerly sought to demonstrate the hereditary character of
idiocy, alcoholism, and criminality. Craniometry, along
with other attempts to identify particular facial features
and body forms with evolutionary retardation and low
intelligence, was regarded as a successful application of
scientific methods to the study of human populations, and
forced sterilization, genocide, and the exclusion of women
and blacks from higher education and the professions were
defended as scientifically correct policies in the first half of
the twentieth century. Here is a typical observation by the
author of several late nineteenth century works on animal
instinct and human cognition and the benefactor of the
Romanes Lectures on Evolutionary Ethics:
Even so highly developed a type of mind as that of
the Negro–submitted, too, as it has been in millions of
individual cases to close contact with minds of the
most progressive type and enjoying as it has in many
thousands of individual cases all the advantages of
liberal education—has never, so far as I can ascertain,
executed one single stroke of original work in any
single department of intellectual activity (Romanes
1893, 13)
Such opinions did not reflect Darwin’s own conflicted but
better-grounded and overall more sympathetic views on
heredity, intelligence, and education, most of which make an
appearance only in his private notebooks. Before going on to
consider his views—both published and unpublished—on
evolution and social policy, I will give a short sketch of his
account of the evolution of the moral sense.
Darwin and the Evolution of the Moral Sentiments
Darwin took a keen interest in moral theory and in
aesthetics, and he was well versed in the philosophical
literature on these topics. A nineteenth century gentleman
scientist could read widely in other disciplines while still
making a fundamental contribution to his own, a feat which
is scarcely imaginable today. He had little doubt that the
human mind, its powers, emotions, and attitudes, had been
shaped by natural selection along with the limbs and organs
of the human body. He proposed that humans and other
animals were endowed with an innate, heritable aesthetic
sense that might assist them in selecting particular mates
and that accordingly explained the evolution of such
display features as elegantly curved horns and brightly
colored plumage. His belief in an innate, heritable moral
sense, explored in his Descent of Man (1871), though less
central to his explanatory program, was equally definite. In
two chapters of his Descent, he drew on the secular
tradition in ethics of Hume and Adam Smith, with its focus
on moral psychology and social interaction, using his
observations and knowledge of the social life of animals
to push back the history of the moral sense into what we
now term the Environment of Evolutionary Adaptation, the
presumed set of environmental and social conditions—
climate, habitat, diet, size, and composition of the social
group—that would have been experienced by the earliest
anatomically modern humans. These chapters are accord-
ingly the founding document of the field of evolutionary
ethics, which today comprises a large popular and semi-
popular literature as well as a technical literature on
altruism, social interaction, the evolution of language and
intelligence, and male and female reproductive strategies.1
In the course of his researches, Darwin had observed
instances of self-sacrifice and devotion throughout the
animal kingdom. He rejected the view of some of his
contemporaries that every action of a living, sentient creature
has a selfish motive, noting that some birds will feed their
blind companions. He cited many examples of sentiment and
altruism in animals: warning, grooming, hunting, removing
thorns, and rescuing, and he did not hesitate to ascribe a rich
psychological life to animals. Cows, he observed, though
they will expel a wounded animal from the herd or gore or
worry it to death, stare intently at a dying companion. A
“strong feeling of inward satisfaction,” he thought, must lead
a bird, “so full of activity, to brood day after day over her
eggs” (Darwin 1871 I:79), and migratory birds must, in the
days before they take flight, feel a restless longing. Starfish
and spiders, Darwin claimed, somewhat less plausibly,
appear to experience some form of parental affection, as
do earwigs (Darwin 1882, 106). The difference between
human and animal was one of degree, not kind, he thought.
Even self-consciousness, he decided, was probably not
absolutely peculiar to man.
Declaring that conscience was the most important
difference between man and the lower animals, he
speculated that "any animal whatever, endowed with well-
marked social instincts, the parental and filial affections
being here included, would inevitably acquire a moral sense
or conscience, as soon as its intellectual powers had
become as well, or nearly as well developed, as in man"
(Ibid. 98). It was exceedingly improbable, he said, that the
impulse to feel sympathy with others, and to try to address
their needs—a instinct which, he allowed, did not embrace
all members of the species, but only one’s familiars—was
acquired by learning. We are influenced, he thought, by the
praise and blame of others; but we experience “an
1 Representative contributions include Hamilton (1964); Trivers
(1971, 1972, 1985), Maynard Smith (1982); Skyrms (1996); Sober
and Sloan Wilson (1998).
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impulsive power widely different from a search after
pleasure….” (Ibid. 120)
The difference, in Darwin’s view, between the mind of
the lowest man and the highest animal was nevertheless
“immense.” Apes could not fashion a stone tool, follow out
a train of metaphysical reasoning, solve a mathematical
problem, reflect on God, or admire a proposition of natural
science, though they could, he thought, make it known that
they were impressed by “the beauty of the coloured skin
and fur of their partners in marriage” (Ibid. 126). Human
imaginings and reminiscences, he thought, had a distinctive
frequency and clarity. “Man… cannot avoid reflection: past
impressions and images are incessantly and clearly passing
through his mind” (Ibid. 112) The relative absence of vivid
mental imagery and recall in nonhuman animals was perhaps
necessary to their ways of life, he mused, else the migratory
bird—for the migratory impulse, he pointed out, is stronger
than the maternal—would be consumed with guilt over
abandoning her unfledged young and taking wing.
Actions, Darwin went on to say, were originally deemed
good or bad as they affected the tribe, and he envisioned a
form of group selection. “No tribe could hold together if
murder, robbery, treachery, & c. were common… A
contented, happy tribe will flourish better than one that is
discontented and unhappy…. “(Ibid. 117, 121). While he
did not consider warfare inevitable and regarded slavery
with repugnance, he believed that agonistic interaction
between tribes in prehistory had shaped the human
character, with the moral virtues of courage, sympathy
and faithfulness offering a competitive advantage (Ibid.
129). This suggested to him that natural morality was
conducive to the happiness of the social body, though not
always the happiness of the individual, and not that of the
entire species. He went beyond description and explanation
to normativity, maintaining that “it would be advisable… to
take as the standard of morality, the general good or welfare
of the community, rather than the general happiness”(Ibid.
121). At the same time, Darwin recognized that the
judgements of the community could lead to “the strangest
customs and superstitions, in complete opposition to the
true welfare and happiness of mankind” (Ibid. 122).
Celibacy was, in his opinion, just such a custom or
superstition, in no way conducive to the general good or
welfare of the community. Infanticide, especially of female
infants, was a practice he regarded more sympathetically as
a means of population control. It was nevertheless an
example of what he meant when he noted that his definition
of welfare “would perhaps require some limitation on
account of political ethics” (Ibid. 121).
Darwin regarded the struggle to exist and to reproduce as
largely invisible. The casual observer could not see, in most
cases, the traits that determined the size of a future lineage
and that would be preserved, because the variations in a
breeding population were so slight. Many relevant
advantages–differences in physiological efficiency, for
example, or sexual attractiveness–are not open to ocular
inspection or appreciated by human onlookers. As con-
ditions change, moreover, an advantage may become a
disadvantage, or vice-versa. Some forms of overt compe-
tition—fighting rivals for territory or for mates—were
evident to naked-eye inspection, but Darwin laid less stress
on these forms of competition than he did on invisible
processes. Yet reading the words “struggle,” and “survival”
in evolutionary writings, many audiences associated them
with war, meritocratic contests, and competition in the
marketplace, all of which involve overt and deliberate effort
to kill, defeat, humiliate, or dismantle the operations of the
opponent. From these assumptions, it was a short step to
the inference, precisely contrary to what Darwin had
posited of animals, that human beings were driven
exclusively by ruthless self-interest, moderated in the case
of females by maternal dispositions and perhaps by paternal
concern in the case of males. War eliminated the inferior
races, and starvation culled the physically weak, incompe-
tent and lazy. Care for those disadvantaged by nature was
perverse on this view and conducive to the degeneration of
the species.2 If good and bad character traits were passed
down from parent to child, marriage and reproduction could
be controlled, not merely to maximize the preservation of
wealth or strengthen political alliances as the aristocracy
had always tried to do, but on a mass scale, so as to
eliminate undesirable traits in the working classes.
The notion that human being should apply the tech-
niques of animal breeders to their own species was as old as
Plato, but the suggestion that much of the human
population was technically unfit to live was the brainchild
of the clergyman Thomas Malthus, whose Essay on
Population (1798) Darwin began to read, according to his
Autobiography, “for amusement” in 1838, and which had,
he claimed, provoked him to consider natural selection as
the explanation of the formation of new species (Darwin
1958, 120). Observing that nature culled her surplus
productions through starvation and disease, Malthus rec-
ommended sexual abstinence for the poor as the only
possible solution to the problem of a limited resource base
and low workers’ wages. “A man who is born into a
world,” Malthus wrote in the second edition of his Essay,
“if he cannot get subsistence from his parents on whom he
has a just demand and if the society does not want his
labour, has no claim of right to the smallest portion of food,
and in fact has no business to be where he is. At nature’s
mighty feast there is no vacant cover for him….” The
infant, Malthus thought, “is, comparatively speaking, of
little value to the society, as others will immediately supply
2 See Bellomy, D C (1984) fr a full treatment of “Social Darwinism.”
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its place” (Malthus 1803, 521). While some readers
accepted these pronouncements as unpleasant but neverthe-
less objective truths, there was much protest as well. More
than 50 years later, Karl Marx referred to the “bungling
interference” of moralizing clergymen, and he and Friedrich
Engels ascribed the squalor and dissipation in the lives of
factory workers, and the high mortality rates of their
children, to the exploitative conditions of their employment.
The claim that competition and conquest rewarded the
best and improved the species was contested from Darwin’s
day onwards.3 John Stuart Mill wrote a diatribe against
taking nature as normative, declaring that nature was the
source of “false taste, false philosophy, false morality,” and
bad law. Lying, dissembling, cruelty, and what he called the
“instinct of domination,” which excited in some persons a
kind of voluptuous thrill in holding others to their will,
were natural inclinations requiring firm repression (Mill
1904, 29). Thomas Henry Huxley, a convinced Darwinian,
was drawn to Buddhist ideals of compassion and detach-
ment. He agreed with Darwin regarding the existence of an
evolutionary basis for morality but declared in his Romanes
Lectures that the struggle to exist at the expense of others
was frankly opposed to morality. Ethics demanded the
repudiation of what he referred to as the “gladiatorial theory
of existence” (Huxley 2004, 33). Alfred Russel Wallace, the
co-discoverer of the principle of natural selection, drew
similar conclusions, According to James Marchant, the
editor of his letters and reminiscences, “The sacrifice…of
human life in dangerous employments for the purpose of
financial gain, no less than the frightful slaughter of the
battlefield, was abhorrent to [him] and aroused his intensest
indignation.” Wallace agitated for women’s rights and
participation in national service, as well as for communal
ownership of land, better housing, higher wages, employ-
ment security, abolition of preventable diseases, and “wider
education, not merely for the practical work of obtaining a
livelihood but to enable [workers] to enjoy art and literature
and song” (Marchant 1916, II: 244–245). Wallace rejected
eugenics, describing it as “the meddlesome interference of
an arrogant scientific priestcraft.” He feared that it would
“perpetuate class distinctions, and postpone social reform,”
and afford quasi-scientific excuses for keeping people ‘‘in
the positions Nature intended them to occupy” (Ibid. 246).
Darwin’s own views on violence, hereditary strengths
and weakness, and the capabilities of the races were
characteristically subtle and sometimes conflicted. One
aim of the Descent of Man was to show that the differences
in facial features, body types, and skin color of different
human groups that would have been impossible or difficult
to explain as environmental adaptations were the product of
sexual selection for beauty, which different groups per-
ceived differently. That these features reflected only
aesthetic preference indicated to him that they were
superficial, bearing no relation to underlying character or
competence. He had been impressed on one of his Beagle
voyages by the ease with which a fully grown Tierra de
Fuegian had been educated into European manners in just a
few years, and in the first edition of the Descent, he
commented on the “numerous points of mental similarity
between the most distinct races of man” and on “the close
similarity between the men of all races in tastes, dispositions,
and habits”(Darwin 1882, 178). At the same time, Darwin’s
materialism led him to the conclusion that psychological
characteristics were just as variable as physical character-
istics, insofar as thought was produced by the brain. “The
races of men,” he had mused in his Notebooks, “differ
chiefly in size, colour, form of head, & features (hence
intellect?) & what kinds of intellect) quantity & kind of hair
forms of legs…” (Darwin 1987, 303).
It is not often realized that Darwin believed in the
inheritance of acquired habits. An animal that adopted some
new practice could transmit the tendency to do so to its
descendants, insofar as the practice would modify the brain
and body of the animal, for according to Darwin’s
hypothesis, the material of inheritance was drawn from
the entire body of the animal (Darwin 1865). He could see
that there must be variation in order for evolutionary
change to occur, and he was convinced that variation could
not be due to chance but must be the effect of a cause,
implying some law-like process. One consequence of the
theory of hereditary habits was that education might have
not only a direct effect on the educatee but actually produce
more brilliant descendants. Hence, at one time or another,
Darwin appeared to hold that human beings are everywhere
basically the same in their mentality no matter how
different their appearances, that their mentality differs as
much as their external appearance, i.e., to a considerable
degree, that the cultural environment induces heritable
changes, and that education can rapidly eliminate substan-
tial behavioral differences.
Darwin’s confusion or indecision on these points stands in
marked contrast to the unempirical and unreflective dogma-
tism of many of his contemporaries. In the Descent, he
expressed himself fatalistically, however, about racial extinc-
tion and the elimination of entire species. He believed that, in
the not too distant future, the “civilised races of man” would
exterminate the “savage races” and the anthropomorphous
apes. Among the members of the civilized nations, who were
destined to survive, improvement was possible and indeed
imperative. “Educate all classes—avoid the contamination of
castes, improve the women...,” he ventured in his early
Notebooks (Darwin 1987, 309).
Darwin’s universalism is evident in his conviction that
moral progress consisted in the enlargement of the motive3 See Crook (1994), 153ff.
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of sympathy and the extension of the helping hand. He
believed that the development of the moral sense from its
earliest human form implied the adoption of broadly
welfarist criteria of moral right.
[A]s man gradually advanced in intellectual power,
and was enabled to trace the more remote consequen-
ces of his actions; as he acquired sufficient knowledge
to reject baneful customs and superstitions; as he
regarded more and more not only the welfare, but the
happiness of his fellow-men; as from habit, following
on beneficial experience, instruction, and example,
his sympathies became more tender and widely
diffused, so as to extend to men of all races, to the
imbecile, maimed, and other useless members of
society, and finally to the lower animals—so would
the standard of his morality rise higher and higher
(Darwin 1871, I:103).
Darwin sensed a conflict between his criterion of moral
progress—the extension of sympathy—and his criterion of
the good of the community. He noted that asylums,
vaccinations, and medical care preserved weak or helpless
persons at a general cost. “No one who has attended to the
breeding of domestic animals will doubt that this must be
highly injurious to the race of man” (Darwin 1882, 168).
He worried that the careful and frugal tended to marry late
in life and to have fewer children than the more careless
and irresponsible members of the population. He insisted,
however, that we must bear “the undoubtedly bad effects”
of moral progress, strengthening this point in the second
edition of the Descent: We cannot check our sympathy
“even at the urging of hard reason, without deterioration in
the noblest part of our nature” (Ibid. 134). The neglect of
the weak would involve overwhelming present evil that
could not be justified in the same way as the surgeon’s
action of cutting out part of a diseased organ, by the
prospect of a greater good. He consoled himself with the
thought that “some elimination of the worst moral
dispositions is always in progress”—through imprisonment
and suicide—and that truly profligate men and women had
few children (Ibid. 137, 162).
Criminality was a disease, Darwin believed, motives
were merely “units in the universe,” and where moral
failure was concerned, “We ought to pity & assist &
educate by putting contingencies in the way to aid motive
power” (Darwin 1987, 608).
One must view a wrecked man, like a sickly one—We
cannot help loathing a diseased offensive object, so
we view wickedness.—it would however be more
proper to pity than to hate….Animals do attack the
weak & sickly as we do the wicked—….[I]t is right to
punish criminals; but solely to deter others” (Ibid.).
“This view should teach profound humility, one deserves
no credit for anything,” Darwin concluded, “… nor ought
one to blame others.” In a fashion reminiscent of the
deterministic philosopher Baruch Spinoza, he decided that
“This view will not do harm, because no one can be really
fully convinced of its truth except man who has thought
very much, & he will know his happiness lays [sic] in
doing good & being perfect …”(Ibid., 608). But he did not
trust his thoughts on determinism and criminality to
publication.
The (Partial) Renewal of Evolutionary Ethics
Not only philosophical and moral resistance but also the
three most significant socio-political events of the twentieth
century put an end to claims for the moral benefits of
commercial and military competition, racial domination,
and the purgation of unfit. The First World War, with its
revolting, prolonged trench warfare and use of poison gas
contradicted the supposition that war preserves the best,
sending the weak to the wall. It was the flower of youth that
had perished or that returned home sick, insane, or
mutilated. The Great Depression put paid to the notion that
individualism and unrestrained competition were natural
and therefore good, and it stimulated the formation of labor
unions and the institution of some features of state
socialism such as national pensions for the aged. Hitler’s
Third Reich and Stalin’s purges created disgust with
eugenics programs and with the very idea of racial purity
and superiority. Existentialists like Jean-Paul Sartre argued
that human beings had no essential nature and were free
and indeed obliged to act and to create regardless of the
seeming constraints imposed by their circumstances.
In the last 50 years, a new set of preoccupations with
sociability and psychology has emerged to replace the old
evolutionary ethics of eugenics and human competitive-
ness. The theory of kin selection (Hamilton 1964), and the
ethological discovery of reciprocal altruism (Trivers 1971)
have shown how unselfish behavior can be advantageous to
an organism or its genes, and cooperation, mating strate-
gies, and moralistic aggression, the tendency of victims or
observers of victimization to retaliate against offenders or
to shun them, or expunge them from the community, have
been studied within the broad context of game theory and
decision theory. Consolation and pacification have been
observed in some primates, who appear to have a sense of
entitlement and fairness, as well as empathy. Franz DeWaal
has argued eloquently that proto-moral dispositions are, as
Darwin had maintained, the precursors of the human moral
sense (De Waal 1996). The current consensus is that there
exists a strong human propensity to assist kin and near
neighbors, an indifference to or hostility towards strangers;
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that there are divergent reproductive strategies in males and
females that favor promiscuity and evasion of parental care
in males and greater sexual selectivity and nurturance in
females. These features are taken by many writers to be
predictive of social conditions and structures, including war
(Wrangham and Peterson 1996), racism (Barash 1979), and
the subordination of women (Wilson 1978, Barash 1979).
Although it is often noted that explanation is not
justification, the motive to eliminate, exclude, and differ-
entiate on the basis of human differences remains promi-
nent in the writings of evolutionary psychologists and
ethicists. The old idea of heritable dispositions that fit some
for lucrative and visible, others for menial, positions in the
social world has been updated and clothed in new graphs and
statistics. International conferences are still devoted to dis-
cussions of what used to be called degeneration, and research
on the problem of the “unfit” continues enthusiastically in
some quarters. As recently as 1994, Richard Herrenstein and
Charles Murray performed the statistical experiment of
“randomly deleting,” from a virtual population, individuals
with an IQ of less than 103, which, they claimed, reduced
poverty by 25% (Herrenstein and Murray 1994). E.O. Wilson,
whose thoughts were influenced by his studies of the smooth
functioning of social insect societies with their rigid divisions
of roles—nurse ants, worker ants, and soldier ants—asserted
in a 1995 paper (Wilson 1995) that “a schedule of sex-and
age-dependent ethics can impart a higher genetic fitness than
a single moral code which is applied uniformly to all sex-age
groups.” He continued as follows:
If there is any truth to this theory of innate moral
pluralism, the requirement for an evolutionary ap-
proach to ethics is self-evident. It should also be clear
that no single set of moral standards can be applied to
all human populations, let alone all sex-age classes
within each population. To impose a uniform code
is…to create complex, intractable moral dilemmas—
these of course are the current condition of mankind
(Wilson 1995, 164).
The results of Herrenstein and Murray’s bizarre and
disturbing exercise would, I take it, make little sense to a
real economist. Wilson’s views are in turn troubling for a
number of reasons. First, “higher genetic fitness”—more
descendants—is not a moral goal. “Genetic fitness” should
not be confused with the vernacular conception of a “fit”
person as healthy and happy (Matthen and Ariew 2002).
Wilson provides no evidence to show that sex-dependent
moral codes promote human health and happiness. The
double standard in sexual morality and all the other
mechanisms of inhibition and immobilization for women,
from footbinding and veiling to claustration and occupa-
tional and educational segregation, would be difficult to
defend as examples of welfare-enhancing policies. Wilson
implies that complex, intractable moral dilemmas arise
from the attempt to apply uniform standards to very
different people. One might suppose to the contrary that
complex and difficult, though not necessarily intractable,
dilemmas arise when divergent social roles are assigned to
people who are basically similar to one another in many but
not in all respects.
Biological Difference and Philosophical Universality
What is the crucial distinction between the philosophical
and the biological approaches to morality that induced E.O.
Wilson to suggest the appropriateness of a transfer of the
responsibility for creating moral knowledge? It is some-
times implied that moral philosophers go awry in proposing
that human beings have a species of free will that is
incompatible with a scientific perspective on human action
and that they maintain, contrary to all that is known about
human populations and their intellectual propensities, that
we are basically all alike and basically all respectful of
abstract, rational considerations. While the influential
eighteenth century moral philosopher Immanuel Kant cer-
tainly did hold views of this sort and while existentialists of
the mid-twentieth century propounded radical and untenable
views about free will, mainstream contemporary philoso-
phers do not share them. They are, however, by and large
committed to the moral principle that the same fundamen-
tal rights, duties, and entitlements pertain to all members
of the species and that inequalities in well-being—liberty,
security, and enjoyment of life—are unjustifiable unless
they can be shown to contribute to the good of each
person they affect. By tolerating variances in well-being, a
society may be able to produce more objects, conditions,
and events that are objectively desirable. But from a moral
point of view, sex, race, and nationality, beauty, and
intelligence ought to have no predictive value with respect
to well-being—whether or not they have a predictive value
with respect to income, prestige, executive authority, and
other desiderata.
This conception of morality was implicit in the writings
of the progressive Victorian reformers of Darwin’s era, but
it is neither self-evident nor uncontroversial. It is opposed
to a rival conception of morality as “giving to each his
due,” where the level of desert is understood to vary
according sex, race, talent, might, lineage, and other such
features. The extent to which universal well-being is
secured by a practice is a useful yardstick for assessing
claims by contemporary evolutionary ethicists to be
contributing valid moral insights. If they endorse the
standard, they should be prepared to defend their prescrip-
tions by reference to it; if they reject it in favor of a
different yardstick for moral decency or goodness, they
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should be prepared to make explicit and defend the rival
standard.
To expand on this point, morality appears to have two
distinct functions. One, call it the “I–thou” function, is to
regulate relations between individuals who are social equals
but who can attain temporary positions of advantage over
one another. Proscriptions against theft, fraud, perjury, and
assault are intended to suppress advantage taking in
situations in which one person is able to act invisibly, or
is better armed, or has more information than another, or
has some other source of leverage. In “I–Thou” situations,
the advantage is temporary and might just as well have
accrued to the other party had circumstances been some-
what different: All of us can steal, cheat, lie, and attack
others. The emergence of I–Thou norms of helpfulness,
truthfulness, restraint, and respect for property and persons,
in the Environment of Evolutionary Adaptation lends itself
to game-theoretic explanation. Persons who encountered
one another frequently in the small group settings of our
remote ancestors would be expected to internalize such
norms and to evolve the disposition to abide by them and to
shun or punish those who did not if it gave them an
advantage in survival and reproduction. Furthermore, the
evolved norms just cited appear to be good ones—ones we
can endorse as good for social life in the contemporary
world as well. Explanation and justification for I–Thou
norms thus go hand in hand.
The second function of morality is not to be confused with
the regulation of dyadic relationships between individuals. It
concerns relationships of subordination that are long-lasting
and irreversible in the normal course of events. Aristocrats
and peons, employers and employees, masters and slaves,
jailers and captives, inhabitants of the Northern Hemisphere
and inhabitants of the Southern, and other groups and classes
stand in relationships of domination and subordination to one
another. In such relationships, while both parties may have
access to sources of leverage that protect their interests,
inequality is not accidental or opportunistic but institution-
ally entrenched, backed by law and custom. The second
mandate for moral theory—call it the “Us–Them” function—
is to assess the relationships that exist between groups of
persons related in this way, for morality limits what members
of one group can do to another for their benefit, or even for
the average benefit of the community. Morality, in this
second sense—the determination of the morally appropriate
“uses’ of entire classes of persons—presents a problem for
the evolutionary ethicist.
The formation of Us–Them relationships typically
implies the suspension of I–Thou morality; for deception,
theft, and bodily injury may be practiced with impunity by
the powerful. When we think of moral progress, however, it
is the development of Us–Them morality that we, like the
Victorian moralists, normally have in mind. But how can
evolutionary theory bear either on the explanation or the
justification of Us–Them morality? Normal empathic emo-
tions are rarely aroused in Us–Them relationships, as the
parties are typically isolated from one another and
individuals in one group do not know individuals of the
other group personally and encounter them frequently. While
in a sense, males and females of all dimorphic species
“exploit” one another for reproductive purposes, genuinely
parasitic relationships between subgroups of the same species
have no models in evolutionary biology and are hard to
conceptualize for the Environment of Early Adaptation with
its small, nomadic populations. Hunter-gatherer societies are
conspicuously egalitarian (Boehm 2000), and exploitation
occurs principally in human societies in which there is field
labor; the manufacture of articles in factory-like conditions;
in which there are rulers, titles, laws, and economic
sanctions that be applied to people; and walls, locks, chains,
and certificates to hold them in or keep them out.
Ethical relations between groups did not and could not
have emerged spontaneously in early human societies, as
Darwin knew. They are a feature of civilization, not culture,
and imply the existence of literacy, a legal system, and formal
codes of conduct. For biology, and specifically evolutionary
theory, to be able to take over successfully where the
philosophers have allegedly failed to lay the conceptual
groundwork for a just and comfortable world, it has to be
shown how the biological perspective could contribute to the
analysis of relations between groups. Yet evolutionary
ethicists have tended, to the contrary, to endorse exploitative
relationships—Pinker, for example, follows E.O. Wilson in
commending workplace segregation by sex—arguing that
insofar as the division of labor is based on important
personality differences traceable to the reproductive roles of
men and women, it cannot be considered unjust. Such
conclusions seem at variance with Pinker’s claim that
evolutionary psychology “can help lead the way to a realistic,
biologically informed humanism…[and] offer a touchstone
by which we can identify suffering and oppression wherever
they occur…” (Pinker 2002, xi). For unless extraordinary
measures for wage equalization independent of occupation
are undertaken, the segregation of the workplace implies
financial hardship and economic dependency for the sex
that is, according to evolutionary psychologists, most in
danger of abandonment by fickle males and most driven to
care for its resource-hungry offspring.
The Role of the Social Sciences
There is a third source of insight, besides biology and
philosophy, that is available to moral theory in the form of
the social sciences—specifically, anthropology, sociology,
and social psychology. It is common to disparage these
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fields as combining the worst features of the natural
sciences and philosophy; to accuse them of befuddling
readers with mathematical models and statistical analyses
while drawing merely speculative conclusions. A theory in
natural science is often seen as validated by its applications.
The theory is held to be true because it can be employed to
satisfy our desires, whether they are for convenient plastic
containers, warmth, cures for our ills, entertainment, or
modes of communication and transport. Theories in the
social sciences can rarely be validated by their applications,
for we cannot manipulate human beings as we do molecules,
and because we would regard it as not morally right to try to
do so. Hence, there are obstacles both in assessing the truth of
claims in the social sciences and in basing decisions upon
them, insofar as we appear to have little experience of
producing what we want by reference to them.
Nevertheless, moral theory—and public morals and
legislation as well—have made significant progress from
the late eighteenth century onwards, thanks to the social
scientists—or their forerunners. The real expansion of
moral understanding and social improvement began with
the French encyclopedists and J.G. Herder in Germany,
continuing with Marx and Engels, Henry Maine, Max
Weber, L.T. Hobhouse, and Karl Mannheim, who estab-
lished the modern historical and analytical theory of
institutions. Their comparative studies of moral and legal
codes and, in particular, the transition from codes based on
status—one’s position in society, nationality, ethnicity,
religion, wealth, sex, occupation, and title—and one’s
powers over others, to codes of conduct based on reciprocal
benefit and equal entitlement furnished the conceptual basis
for modern philosophical egalitarianism.4 The engaged,
participatory mode of anthropology initiated by Franz Boas,
and his rejection of the teleological conception of history,
according to which the civilized nations must either destroy
or absorb and rule the primitive members of the species,
was crucial to the formation of what Guy Stocking refers to
as the “new paradigm of the social sciences” (Stocking
1968). Boas argued that the mental functions of abstract
thought, the inhibition of impulses, and (as Darwin had so
vigorously insisted) the application of aesthetic and ethical
standards to objects, events, and persons, were common to
all human beings (Stocking 1968, 220). “Culture” was
universal, while “civilization” described an urbanized,
militarized, commercial mode of life intrinsically no more
valuable than any other form of culture. Describing the new
paradigm, Stocking comments that it involved:
the rejection of simplistic models of biological or
racial determinism, the rejection of ethnocentric
standards of cultural evaluation, and a new appreci-
ation of the role of unconscious social processes in
the determination of human behavior. It implied a
conception of man not as a rational so much as a
rationalizing being (Ibid. 232).
Can the biological sciences, whose early racist and
militaristic extrapolations were refuted and rejected by the
critical social sciences, re-emerge to cooperate with them?
Can they do more than defend social inequalities and
oppression as natural and inevitable in light of human
biological differences? This is the key question for the future
of evolutionary ethics. I would insist that the biological
sciences can perform in this role but only to the extent that
the field of evolutionary ethics can rise to the challenge of
exploring the ways in which social oppression is based on
mythology and ideology and to the extent that it can replace
conventional beliefs with a scientifically more accurate
image of people and their world.
Historically, moral and political policies have been based
either upon mythologies of the supernatural or else
mythologies involving nature. The belief in the special
creation of species, in God’s providential care for the world
and everyone and everything in it, and in compensation for
unjust suffering and retaliation for unpunished wickedness
in the next life, are examples of moral supernaturalism that
tend to promote ethical complacency and resignation where
social inequality is concerned. On the naturalistic side,
fanciful cosmological models of higher and lower powers
and empirically false assumptions about the distribution of
rationality and competence have served to rationalize
oppression, maintaining the position of the parasitic classes
of society—aristocrats, landowners, and priests—and not
only allowing but also encouraging persecutory impulses.
The new human sciences, predicated on the assumption that
not only our bodies but also our minds and feelings as well
are the products of a long evolutionary history, can
potentially help us to frame a more accurate image of
reality than folklore, philosophy, or the imaginations of
novelists and dramatists. For as worthwhile as these cultural
forms are, they are not sources of moral knowledge
uncolored by bias and unwarranted assumptions.
As I noted at the beginning of this essay, human beings
have no functions, no purposes, in virtue of which their
qualities can be evaluated, except those they themselves
decide to adopt. A person is, from the biologist’s
perspective, a temporary federation of replicators that are
working to be represented in future generations, sometimes
threatened, sometimes exploited, and sometimes assisted by
other federations of replicators (Dawkins 1999). We exist
not to glorify God, nor to exercise rationality, nor to bring
about any particular conditions of society, but merely
because we are assemblages of successful replicators.
4 The substitution of contract for status as the basic principle of law
was explored by Maine (1851); Morgan (1877); and Hobhouse
(1915).
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Reproduction is the habitual practice of every organism; it
is not the specialization of females, but of every living
creature, and sooner or later, after the completion of this
task, the individual dies. Furthermore, everyone now living
is the descendant of ancestors whose qualities enabled them
to survive and reproduce under demanding conditions—
outfacing plagues, famines, natural disasters, and all the
exigencies of social life and social conflict. In this respect,
we are all biologically equal. Virtually all of us will have no
descendants at all after some large number of generations
have lived and died. In this respect, too, we are all
biologically equal.
By employing empirical methods, we have learned that
people value fairness in many cases more than they do
profit, that performance on IQ tests is heavily dependent on
early exposure to categorical reasoning (Flynn 1994, 1999),
that there are more women with extraordinary mathematical
ability than might be supposed from an inspection of
university faculties (Spelke 2005), and that early humans
were likely “cooperative breeders” who raised their
children in all female subgroups rather than in male–female
pairs (Hrdy, 1999). We have also learned that human beings
are subject to systematic distortions in their perceptions of
responsibility and guilt, most likely for reasons that reflect
age-old habits of cognition of causes and the interpretation
of the social world (Lerner 1980). More recently, studies of
“cognition in the wild” (Hutchins 1996), the “adapted
mind” (Barkow et al. 1992), “ecological rationality”
(Gigerenzer et al. 1999), and the origins of religious faith
in innate human biases and predispositions (Atran and
Norenzayan 2004) have shed light on the formation of both
rational and irrational beliefs and belief systems. All this is
morally important knowledge. But even if it constitutes
genuine knowledge, a problem remains. How can what is
the case have any definite implications for morality?
Putting the question in traditional philosophical terms,
how is ought to be derived from is?
To make headway on this question, we need first to give
up the notion that some ideal natural science of the future
would enable us to deduce a complete set of moral
prescriptions that would supplant the various codes with
which various cultures and subcultures currently operate and
be obligatory for everyone, on pain of ostracism or
punishment. This is an absurd and even frightening fantasy,
bearing no relation to the way in which moral theory actually
advances and moral progress occurs. Rather, history indi-
cates that moral progress in Us–Them relationships occurs
when both the costs and consequences of the relationship
become clearer and more vivid to all parties involved and
when alternatives to an oppressive practice become not only
imaginable but are also recognized as practicable. Consider
the persecution of homosexuals, against which E.O. Wilson
once protested on biological grounds: We now grasp that
homosexuality is no more unnatural than heterosexuality,
just less frequent; that heterosexual relationships will still be
forged and children will continue to be born, even if
homosexual marriage is legalized; and that interference with
their companionship preferences and stigmatization has
driven good people to desperation and suicide, which the
psychological uplift produced in their persecutors can hardly
be supposed to justify.
A morally important category of costs—perhaps the most
important category—consists in the repression or suppres-
sion of what earlier writers termed “instincts.” As Darwin
pointed out, animals must be uncomfortable in not being able
to do, and comfortable in doing, what is “instinctive”
(Darwin 1987, 67-8). This crucial observation points to a
pathway—however bestrewn with conceptual obstacles the
pathway may be—between morality and science, indeed
between morality and evolutionary theory. It is distressing
to be deprived of food, water, breathable air, and space, and
such deprivations have no justification except possibly
punishment. By extension, to deprive people of the
opportunity to practice courtship rituals, to engage in
diurnal cycles of activity and inactivity, to roam and forage
independently, and to socialize with others whom they like
and avoid those whom they do not, is a form of punishment,
insofar as these activities are experienced as pleasurable by
most members of our species. Accordingly, one ought not to
try to change or repress ancient patterns unless there are
strong reasons for doing so. Either the attempt will likely
produce stress if repression is successful, or it will consume
resources to no avail if it is not. Furthermore, if some
alternative practice or form of social organization would
permit people to act in ways that were more natural, hence
more pleasurable and satisfying, it is preferable, other
considerations being equal. Many of the benefits of
civilization require some degree of repression of human
spontaneity. However, by accepting some sacrifices in
efficiency and productivity, we might well be able to
purchase a society with less stress and depression, as well as
less violence and ugliness.
The appeal to biological knowledge should accordingly
be employed for critical and revisionary, not foundational
purposes. Let me give some further examples. First, if
factory labor has morally objectionable features, this cannot
be so merely because it assigns to the capitalist the surplus
value of the laborer. For one might reasonably ask: and
what is so bad about that assignment? A deeper reason must
be sought, and it can be found in the pleasure human beings
take in crafting articles of daily and special-occasion use
according to their own and their community’s aesthetic
standards—the craftsman’s instinct that is typical of a
habile and ingenious species. Agricultural field work,
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factory work, and desk work are the three economic
supports for civilized life, but they do not, for the most
part, gratify this instinct. While we cannot reproduce the
labor environment of the putative Environment of Early
Adaptation and continue to consume and experience as we
currently do, we can in principle adjust workplace
conditions and surroundings to make them more natural
and reduce consumption so as to reduce the hours that have
to be worked under unnatural conditions.
Second, if the exclusion of women from the professions,
government, and the priesthood is morally unjustifiable, the
argument cannot be made merely on the basis of the
equality of their souls; it should rest on the fact that men
and women are no different in their basic cognitive
apparatus, their analytical ability and creativity, or their
interest in what happens in their world and in their
neighborhood, and that to deprive them of the opportunity
to exercise their capabilities is to do them moral harm.
Finally, if our current laws and customs provide poorly for
parents and children in the event of marital breakdown, this
is not because a few human beings are willful, selfish, and
neurotic and deserve the anguish and chaos they generate.
By reframing laws and institutions on the assumption that
untroubled, lifelong sexual exclusivity is not the expected
condition of members of our species and that people are
prone to change their preferences, to experience extremes
of jealousy and despair at abandonment and to feel strongly
possessive about and protective of their children, we might
find ways to protect people from the worst consequences of
their own emotionality. All social changes are somewhat
costly, not only because most entrenched cultural practices
have some positive rationale but also because change as
such can be stressful, and side effects are often unantici-
pated.5 Nevertheless, where human welfare can be en-
hanced with minimal disruption, it is morally right to try to
bring this about.
Ambivalence and the Construction of Moral Codes
In the same essay that recommended the imposition or
preservation of sex- and age-dependent moral codes that I
have been questioning, E.O. Wilson advanced a notion that
is as significant for moral theory as the notion of norms
dictated by universal, evolutionarily acquired preferences
and indeed ultimately more useful, namely ambivalence.
Behavioral responses, he noted, “must bring into play an
efficient mixture of personal survival, reproduction, and
altruism.” Consequently,
the centers of the complex tax the conscious mind
with ambivalences whenever the organisms encounter
stressful situations. Love joins hate; aggression, fear;
expansiveness, withdrawal and so on; in blends
designed not to promote the happiness and survival
of the individual, but to favor the maximum trans-
mission of controlling genes. These ambivalences
stem from counteracting pressures on the units of
natural selection (Wilson 1995, 155).
Insofar as a unit of selection may be a gene, or some
other tiny replicator, an individual organism, or a group, our
emotional states reflect “the balance of counteracting
selection forces at different levels.” Altruism may conflict
with sexual motives, love of offspring with selfishness.
As Christopher Boehm observes, developing this point,
the fundamental ambivalences generated by biological
demands are universal, as human practices governing
childhood, sex, and death and dying are not (Boehm
1989). The variety of norms governing killing, insulting,
harming, using, defrauding, and interfering and allowing
in sexual and parental behavior represent the different
strategies societies have adopted to manage these conflicts.
Moral codes specify how some dilemmas involving
conflicting biological imperatives are to be resolved and
so tend to the resolution of ambivalence, though the
adoption of a moral code can itself generate ambivalence
about abiding by the norm, and moral systems themselves
are notoriously productive of dilemmas. Within the con-
straints imposed and the practices they know to be
approved and disapproved by their societies, ambivalent
individuals make choices as well. They decide how faithful,
how conniving, how punitive, repressive or tolerant, or
nurturing to be. Furthermore, they decide differently, and
there is no guarantee that their actions achieve the goals that
nevertheless explain them. There is often no objective
answer to the question whether a particular practice is
morally optimal, for there are many competing standards of
success and failure. The goals we have—collective and
personal achievement, minimization of suffering, and
individual development—conflict, insofar as the compro-
mises that can promote one may not promote the others.
Ambivalence, oscillation, and plain incoherence further
result from the overlay of the biological platform with a
cloudy blend of recognition and misapprehension where
our own long-term rational interests are concerned. We
romanticize living nature and feel well amidst plants and
animals, in the fresh air and sunlight, but we destroy,
poison, and obscure them for the sake of money in the
bank. We adore our progeny and sacrifice for them,
5 Dilemmas of stasis and change are discussed in Wilson 2004. esp.
Chaps. 4 and 8.
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individually and collectively, while regarding them in some
respects as inconvenient and negligible where their long-
term interests are concerned. As a society, we are apt to
venerate the abstract notion of social equality and to
maintain that we, inhabitants of Western democracies, are
all equal now while accepting egregious differences in
health status, income, and satisfaction with life among
groups as inevitable, or inexplicable, or as caused by the
fortunate or unfortunate agents themselves. To bring these
conflicts and confusions to light and to explore new ways
of managing them is a task for moral theorists of the present
and of the future. We should bear in mind that the
Environment of Evolutionary Adaptation, where our orig-
inal competencies and dispositions were formed, was a very
different place, one in which human beings lived in small
groups of perhaps 10–30 individuals, comprised largely of
kinfolk. The minds and emotions we have inherited are, as
Richard Dawkins puts it, “out of date, built under the
influence of genes that were selected in some earlier era”
(Dawkins 1999, 35).
Concluding Postscript
By way of attempting a reductio ad absurdum of the
position of certain genetic determinists, let me observe that
if (what is, of course, not the case) the IQ of every person
was equal to the numerical average of the IQs of his or her
two parents and if our society was perfectly “meritocratic”
in awarding to each person a salary of $1,000 per year per
IQ point, economic inequality, as we currently experience
it, would vanish and with it much of the variance in well-
being, between individuals and between groups as well.
The irrelevance of the heritability of traits where questions
of welfare are concerned and the way in which our existing
institutions redistribute welfare in ways that have no basis
in nature are both evident from this simple example. To
take the notion of Darwinian morality seriously, we should
not be seduced into thinking that political and social reality
are captured in the caricatures of territorial apes, harem-
keeping males, and drab, coy females who roam the
popular literature on evolutionary ethics. We should remain
vigilant about and critical of claims regarding the suitability
and unsuitability of entire groups of persons for various
social roles. We can do no better than to return to Darwin’s
original concerns with the basic panhuman similarity in
intellectual capability and emotional reactions, with the
enlargement of the role of sympathy in advanced moral
codes, and with the recognition that strange customs and
irrational policies are as much the free products of human
invention as the plays, pictures, and palaces that represent
the pinnacle of artistic achievement or the results of science
and mathematics.
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